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In this paper we examine the efficiency of public service delivery at regional level in two countries, the UK and China. We introduce a method based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which measures the aggregate country level inefficiency. This country level inefficiency is then decomposed into three components: 1) lack of best practices at regional level; 2) quality of the public service delivery; 3) potential efficiency gains realizable via reallocation of inputs across regions. Our empirical results show that UK and China behave very differently across these three dimensions. Most of UK inefficiency comes from the reallocation effect, while most of the Chinese inefficiency is attributable to lack of best practices. UK also shows higher levels of quality with respect to China. We speculate about the fiscal centralization/decentralization structure of the two countries as a possible explanation for such differences.
In his book The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith stated one of the duties of the sovereign or commonwealth as "that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which are useful but not capable of bringing in a profit to individuals. These are chiefly institutions for facilitating commerce and promoting instruction of the people." (Book V, chap I , p.244, The Wealth of Nations). In this paper we examine the efficiency of public service delivery in two different countries, the UK and China. We introduce two main innovations, one methodological and one empirical. First, we model explicitly for the quality of public service delivery. The quality of public service is becoming increasingly important for the general public and consequently for policy makers. This is in line with the expectation that with rising living standards, demand will tend to shift towards higher quality services rather than larger quantities of low quality services (for example, parents expect to receive a better education for their children, rather than expecting to "park" them in school for longer hours). By taking into account the quality of public service delivery, we come out with an overall indicator (both at regional and national level) which completely quantifies the observed trade-off between quality attributes and quantity outputs of public service delivery. The most direct way of interpreting the indicator we propose is to think of it as the overall output quantity loss that the government has to incur in order to attain the observed level of quality. The benchmark for such a comparison would be a baseline (zero) quality outcome which returns the highest possible output quantity (our benchmark would be, for example, "parking" children in school for long hours without providing any educational outcome). In other words, we are able to measure the quality of public service in terms of the output quantity that has to be traded off in order to attain the given level of quality. Once the quality/quantity trade-off has been accounted for, we proceed with the definition of an aggregate measure of public service delivery inefficiency at the country level as opposed to the same measure computed at regional level. In order to do so we modify a recent method (see (Peyrache 2013) ) in order to account for quality attributes. We define a measure of inefficiency at the country level and show that it is possible to decompose it into three meaningful and mutually exclusive components: a) a measure of technical inefficiency arising from the fact that regions are not operating at their benchmark potential; b) a measure of the impact of the quality attributes, which provides at the aggregate level information on the quality/quantity trade-off; c) a measure of the potential for efficiency improvement arising from reallocation of inputs across regions. The intuition behind this last component is that regions may not be operating on an optimal scale or may be operating with sub-optimal input mix (for example, regions may have shortages of specific inputs); by reallocating resources across regions it is possible to remove these inefficiencies and increase the overall country level output of public service.
Our second contribution is a thoughtful discussion on the possible causes which drive differences between the UK and China. In particular, the choice of these two specific countries is determined by our interest in the impact of the fiscal structure on the efficiency with which public service is delivered. The UK represents a highly centralized fiscal system while modern China represents a highly decentralized one. Throughout history, around the world, we can find many examples of wealthy nations under decentralized regimes, for instance decentralized England in the 18th century and America in the 19th century (until present). Modern China is also a successful example of decentralized provision of public service, although ancient China has a long history of centralization and experienced successes and failures in dynastic cycles. Some other examples such as the experience of Latin American countries have been relatively unsuccessful. We draw implications based on the different sources of inefficiency in each system. Of course, we are aware that this discussion cannot be directly linked to our empirical results because there may be many other causes for the inefficiency differential we observe between China and the UK. Thus the discussion may be in some way of a speculative nature. Nevertheless, we think such a discussion is useful in order to frame our results in a more general policy debate and inform scholars about the data problems we encountered while dealing with the decentralization issue. Our main empirical result point to the fact that in the UK the major source of inefficiency at the aggregate level is due to the reallocation component, while in China the major source of aggregate inefficiency is due to technical inefficiency (lack of best practice). Our interpretation of this result is that decentralized systems (like China) are better at allocating resources efficiently across regions, while centralized systems (like UK) are more capable of pushing the adoption of best practices across regions (at the expense of reallocation inefficiency).
The paper is structured as follow. In section I we give a brief background of the structure of public service provision in each country. In section II we describe the methodology used to measure and examine inefficiency in each system. The data and variables used are introduced in section III. Empirical results are presented and discussed in section IV. Finally, in section V we conclude.
I. The structure of public finance in Modern China and the UK
Modern China
The evolution of inter-government fiscal relationship should be understood in the context of economic reform and development following three distinct phases over time: the pre-reform phase prior to 1979, the transitional phase of 1980-1993, and the post-1994 phase. The following gives a brief overview of the fiscal reform which has resulted in the current fiscal structure in China. Further details can be found in the literature for instance, (Agarwala 1992) (Jin, Qian and Weingast 2005) and (Shen, Jin and Zou 2012) .
Prior to the economic reform of 1978-1979, the fiscal relations between the central and provincial governments are best described as formed under a consolidated budget system under which the central government set spending priorities (unified spending) and revenues were largely collected from state-owned enterprises in the form of profit and taxes (unified revenue). Local governments lacking discretionary spending power were agents of the central government, just as the state-owned enterprises. Intergovernmental transfers were set to finance the gap between locally collected revenues and permitted local expenditures.
Along with the economic reform which started in 1978, the central-local government fiscal relations changed significantly. A fiscal revenue sharing system replaced the highly centralized system in 1980 to provide local governments with an incentive to collect revenue. In the period 1988 -1993, the government implemented a "fiscal contracting system". Under the fiscal contract system, some provinces had to remit to the central government part of their revenues, according to a predetermined lump-sum amount or a progressively increasing ratio of revenues. The central government depended a great deal on this local transfer from the better-off provinces during that period. On average, the local revenue accounted for about 66% of total government budgetary revenue over fiscal contracts.
Starting 1994, the fiscal contracting system was replaced by separating tax system. The tax sharing reform in 1994 explicitly defined fiscal revenue as the central revenue, shared revenue and the local revenue. The central government changed the revenue sharing arrangement little by little after the 1994 reform by adjusting proportion of the shared revenue that goes to the central government upwards 1 . Compared to the previous period, the financing of public service is re-centralized but it is still relatively decentralized. Also, a large portion of expenditure responsibility is devolved to local governments despite the re-centralization of tax revenues after the 1994 tax reform. Local governments play the key role in providing social services such as education, health care, social security, housing and urban/local services subject to tightening budget. Figure 4 shows the change of local vs. central government revenue and expenditure over the years. Figure5 shows a significant drop in the ratio of local government revenue after 1994 while ratio of local government expenditure increase steadily over time. 2 1 For instance, from May 1997, the sharing ratio of Stamp Taxes on Security Exchange between the central and local governments was adjusted from 50%-50% to 88%-12%; from 1st Oct 2000, it was changed to 97%-3% in subsequent three Years; since January 1, 2002, the central and local governments share all the company income tax revenues, except a list of enterprises, and personal income tax revenues together at the ratio of 50%-50% in 2002 50%-50% in . In 2003 50%-50% in and 2004 , the central government's sharing rate went up to 60%.
2 Note that the reported statistics by Chinese government is in a way misleading in the sense that there is a big gap
In China, a characteristic of fiscal reform is that it goes hand in hand with economic development. Decentralization as a result of the fiscal reform makes it possible for resource allocated for regional public service to be directly linked with regional economic development. Regional economic development determines local government revenue which then determines how much resources are available for delivering public goods in each region. However, with central government seizing more local government revenue after the 1994 tax reform, this link may not be as tight as before.
UK
UK is a country with a relatively high level of fiscal centralization in the sense that local government is part but not a major part of public sector. Local authorities' expenditure accounts for around a quarter of total expenditure of the government and this proportion has changed little for many years (see Figure 6 and 7).
Local government expenditure is largely funded by the central government. The expenditure by the devolved administrations of Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive is largely funded by block grant from the UK government. Each devolved administration thus has devolved power in certain service areas subject to the limit of funding from the UK government. In England, local authority expenditure is financed through a balance of central government grant including non-domestic rates and the locally raised council tax and some other income sources such as capital receipts and investment income. The main services delivered by local government in English regions are primary and secondary education and social services. The main services funded by central government are the National Health Service, social benefits and pensions, defense, and higher and further education.
Although fiscal power is still relatively centralized at central government, there has been some progress of devolution of power in the past decades. For instance, Under the Scotland Act 1998, the Parliament can pass Acts and the Scottish Executive can make secondary legislation in areas other than those which are reserved to Westminster. In particular, the Parliament has the power to vary the standard rate of income tax by up to 3 percentage points from the UK level, to give additional source of income. The main service areas in which Scotland has devolved power include health, education, local government, housing, economic development and financial assistance to industry and some of transport. Under the Government of Wales Act 1998, the Assembly can make delegated or secondary legislation, such as orders and regulations, in devolved areas, but primary legislation for Wales in devolved areas is still made by the UK Parliament. The National Assembly for Wales has devolved powers mainly in the areas of health, education, local government, housing, economic development, transport and others. Under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, there is triple division of areas regarding Northern Ireland devolution. The Northern Ireland Assembly can legislate in respect of 'transferred' matters. It can pass both primary and secondary legislation. Other matters are either "reserved" or "excepted". The areas transferred to the Assembly mainly include health, education, regional development, enterprise, trade and investment. In Engbetween reported local revenue and local expenditure in Figure 1 . This is because the reported revenue includes local tax revenue and shared taxed revenue, but not transfers from central government (such as tax rebates and equalization grant).
land, the government introduced the Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Bill to Parliament in November 2002. These assemblies were to be responsible for regional strategies dealing with sustainable development, economic development, spatial planning, transport, waste, housing, culture (including tourism) and biodiversity. In 2004, North East referendum for an elected regional assembly took place, in which the people of the region delivered a 'no' vote to government. According to University College London (UCL) devolution monitoring reports 3 , the result seemed to be indicative of a more general feeling of disenchantment with politicians. It seems there was also a wider skepticism concerning the capability of devloution, what was perceived to be, another layer of bureaucracy and the tax that would accompany it. The future agenda regarding the devolution of English regions is rather unclear.
Note that unlike China, in the UK, centralization means that resource allocation across regions is largely planned and controlled by the central government rather than being directly link with local fiscal revenue.
II. Methodology
The general framework we use to measure inefficiency is data envelopment analysis (DEA) using directional distance functions (DDF). DEA involves the use of linear programming methods to construct a non-parametric piece-wise surface (frontier) of the data. Efficiency measures are then calculated relative to this surface ( (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 1978) ; (Farrell 1957) ).
To construct the surface or frontier, we need to describe the production possibilities set (or technology, or production set). Consider a region where x ∈ R N + inputs produce y ∈ R M + output quantities (public services) with quality attributes a ∈ R J + . Observations for a panel data are collected into three matrices: the input matrix X t = x t 1 ... x t K of dimension K × N for each time period; the output quantity matrix Y t = y t 1 ... y t K of dimension K × M for each time period; and the output quality attributes matrix A t = a t 1 ... a t J of dimension K × J. The dataset can be represented by the collection of these matrices:
We make the following assumptions in order to define the production possibilities set: A1) Convexity; A2) Free disposability of inputs; A3) Quality attributes are freely disposable; A4) Output quantities are weakly disposable with respect to quality attributes; A5) Quality attributes and output quantities are nulljoint. The first two assumptions are standard in the DEA approach to efficiency measurement and we have no much to say about this. The third assumption is basically stating that it is possible to freely dispose of quality attributes; in other words, it is possible to produce positive output quantities of no (or poor) quality. Assumption 4 implies that disposing of output quantities is only possible by a similar contraction in the overall quality attributes of this quantity. Finally, assumption 5 means that production of zero quantity of output is possible only by producing zero quality. To show how these assumptions are intuitive, we report a simple graphical representation of an output set where inputs are producing one quantity output and one quality attribute. From Figure 1 it is clear the following: a) it is always possible to produce a positive output quantity of no quality; b) for a given level of quality, output quantity can be reduced only up to a (positive) point; c) there is a region showing a trade-off between quantity and quality. The major consequence of these assumptions is that we can use a recent result of (Fare and Grosskopf 2012) to show that quantity outputs are jointly limitational for quality attributes, i.e. given a certain quantity of outputs only a finite level of quality can be attained (even by pushing cost/inputs to infinity). Since quantities are limitational for quality, it means that for each level of output quantities there is a maximal attainable level of quality that can be met by expanding cost (or input usage) towards infinity. This is represented in Figure 2 with an alternative graphical representation. Here we have on the x-axis the input used and on the y-axis the quality of a given output quantity (which is fixed atȳ). It is clear from the figure that for a given output quantity level, the level of quality that can be attained is limited and is a function of input usage. In other words, for any given level of output quantity, the quality of such output can be increased only by using additional inputs (or additional cost) and there is a limit to the level that can be attained. From a purely technical (and computational) point of view this approach is equivalent to the plant capacity approach proposed in (Fare, Grosskopf and Zelenyuk 2008) . The major consequence of the assumptions we made is therefore that we can now define two different benchmarks for a given region: first, an unconditional benchmark which does not take into account the quality attributes; second, a benchmark conditional on the quality attributes. The idea of the first benchmark is to compare regions which produce the same level of output quantities, irrespective of the quality with which these are produced. Since part of the cost differences that we then observe are a function of the different level of quality that is attained, in a second stage we take this into account by separating the effect of quality from the effect of pure inefficiency.
We define the regional level public service production technology as the variable returns to scale (VRS) envelope of the dataset X t , Y t , A t , t = 1, ..., T :
Potential technical inefficiency (TE) of public service delivery is defined as:
In this second definition we are eliminating the constraint associated with output qualities and we look at the potential input saving and output expansion that can be achieved. Another way of interpreting this quantity is the following: suppose we ignore our quality benchmark and we are ready to give up all the quality in order to reach a higher output quantity target; then the quantity embedded in TE is giving us this potential expansion. Given our discussion about limitationality, we know that T E ≥ QT E and the impact of the quality attributes on overall input usage will be measured as the difference between these two measures (this is also true from a technical point of view because we are omitting some of the constraints in order to compute TE):
This indicator just defined has a nice and neat interpretation: it is the amount of inputoutput quantity that the regions must give up in order to attain the observed level of quality. In other words, we are able to capture the trade-off between quality and quantity by means of a single number for each individual region. Since we have defined formally the tradeoff between quantity and quality, our next task is to proceed to the definition of aggregate measures of performance at the country level.
The group or aggregate level production possibilities set is given as the sum of S identical regional production possibilities sets (see (Fare et al. 2008) ; (Nesterenko and Zelenyuk 2007) ; and (Li and Ng 1995) ):
The country level production possibility set is defined as the union of all the possible aggregate production technologies (see (Peyrache 2013) ): Figure 3 reports a graphical representation of these different technology sets. Country level potential technical inefficiency (IE) is defined as the potential expansion of output quantities and contraction of inputs when the country level technology is used as a benchmark:
This optimization problem can also be represented (in an equivalent way) by the following integer linear program:
where K * is an integer number to be determined by the optimal solution. The optimal value of the intensity constraint in the previous definition is interpreted as the optimal number of regions which should populate the country in order for public service to be delivered efficiently. The efficiency indicator at country level gives a measure of total input waste and output loss at the country level as a whole. It is important to emphasize that definition (5) and (9) differ because of the different benchmark technology they use: definition (5) is using the regional level production technology, while definition (9) is using the country level production technology. Since all the differences come down to these two definitions of technology, we report in figure 3 a diagrammatic representation of the two different technologies used to compute the two alternative indicators.
Since DDF is an absolute measure of inefficiency expressed in a given common numeraire for all the regions, it is possible to compute it for each region in the dataset and sum it up into an index of country technical inefficiency:
This indicator is a measure of waste in inputs and loss in outputs at the country level, due to the technical inefficiencies of the regions actually operating in the country. We now define the total observed inputs and outputs at time t for the entire country as:
A measure of country inefficiency is given by the following mixed integer linear program:
It should be noted that even if all the regions in the country are technical efficient (i.e., IT E = 0), the country as a whole could still be inefficiently organized (i.e., IE t > 0). The discrepancy between the two indicators is a measure of reallocation inefficiency at the country level:
This indicator is always larger than zero (IT E t ≤ IE t ) and represents the inefficiency arising from the way public service delivery is structured across regions. This discrepancy is attributable to input reallocation across regions and it arises because of possible scale and input mix effects. Now, since we are able to represent the quality-quantity trade-off via an overall indicator based on directional distance function and since we can compute this indicator for each region, it is possible to sum up all this indicators into an aggregate measure of quality attributes:
QT E
Our country level technical inefficiency measure is therefore decomposed into:
Therefore, inserting this expression into our country level decomposition, we obtain a structural decomposition of country level inefficiency into the following three components:
The first component measures how much input is wasted and output is lost because of technical inefficiency of individual regions. The second component is an aggregate measure of the quality-quantity trade-off: it tells us how much additional input-output quantity are used in order to secure the observed level of output quality. The last component measures potential efficiency improvements that may arise from the reallocation of inputs across regions. A more direct interpretation of this decomposition can be provided in percentage terms:
where
This transformation gives a more direct interpretation of how much the different components contributes to the overall inefficiency of the country.
III. Data and variables
Public expenditure in the UK is planned and controlled at the central level on a departmental basis. For the country and regional analysis, total managed expenditure is divided into identifiable and non-identifiable expenditure. Identifiable expenditure is the one which can be recognized as having been incurred for the benefit of individuals, enterprises or communities within particular regions. Examples are mostly health, education and transport services, and spending on social security and on pensions. It also includes local collective services which are consumed locally such as all local authority spending; central government spending on Regional Development Agencies; central government spending on police and local courts. Non-identifiable expenditure is the one which cannot be so identified, for example because it is deemed to be incurred on behalf of the United Kingdom as a whole, e.g. defense expenditure, overseas representation, tax collection and some environmental protection spending. We use identifiable regional expenditure at the regional level as input. We cover the service areas of housing, education, health and transport. Figure 8 and 9 show the pattern in local government expenditure across the regions and over the years in the UK. They also show that the subtotal expenditure selected to cover certain public service areas exhibits similar patterns to the total expenditure across the regions.
Regarding the output of the expenditures explained above, we use the following indicators to reflect the outcome of public service delivery. The indicators cover the service areas of housing, education, health and transport.
• Housing: We use the indicator of housing affordability. This is defined as the ratio of average gross disposable household income (GDHI) over average housing price. GDHI is the amount of money that households have available for spending or saving. This is money left after expenditure associated with income, e.g. taxes and social contributions, and provision for future pension income. We consider this ratio as a quality instead of quantity measure and treat them differently from quantity measures as described above.
• Education: We use number of teachers, GCSE achievements of pupils and the Pupil teacher ratio to indicate the service delivery in the area of education. GCSE (GNVQ in Scotland) achievement is measure as the percentage of 15 year old pupils achieving 5 or more GCSEs at grade of A*-C. Pupil teacher ratio is calculated by dividing the total FTE number of pupils on roll in schools by the total FTE number of qualified teachers regularly employed in schools. The ratio only refers to the public funded school sector (both primary and secondary). The ratio is then converted into number of teachers per 100 students to be used as one of the outputs. We consider pupil teacher ratio and GCSE achievement as quality measures .
• Health: We use three indicators to reflect the service in NHS hospital bed availability and general practitioner's availability. In terms of NHS hospital beds, we use number of hospital beds (both overnight and day beds). In terms of GP availability, we use the number of practitioner in each region. Figures for GPs include all practitioners excluding GP registrars and GP retainers.
• Transport: We use road traffic and public transport indicators. The flow of traffic is measured by million vehicles kilometers on all roads . And to reflect how often residents use public transport, average distance traveled by residents using public transport mode is also measured. Public transport mode includes bus, underground, railway, taxi, air and ferries.
The complete data sample as a result of the collection of the above variables is 12 regions (9 English office regions and Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) over the period of 2000-2010. Data are rather incomplete in years before 2000, therefore are not included. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of main variables and their sources.
In contrast with the top-down approach in the UK, China adopts the bottom-up approach for public expenditure. In fact, the China statistic yearbooks only provide statistics on local government expenditure at regional level but not central government expenditure allocated at regional level. However, after the tax reform in 1994, the budgeted local government expenditure is financed by local tax revenue, shared tax revenue and tax refund (transfer) from the central government. Therefore the reported local government expenditure is partly financed by central government.
Before 2007 February 28, 2011) . Therefore the classifications of government expenditures at regional level explained below have changed since 2007. But this should not have too big impact on our results as we use the aggregate expenditure as the single input. Consistent with the UK data, we use government expenditure at regional level that covers the main service areas of housing, education, public health and transport. Figure 10 and 11 show the pattern in local government expenditure across the regions and over the years in China. They also show that the subtotal expenditure selected to cover certain public service areas exhibits similar patterns to the total expenditure across the regions.
To measure the outcome of public service delivery at regional level, we use the following indicators:
• Housing: affordability ratio which is defined as urban household disposable income over urban residential house price per square meter of floor area
• Education: pupil teacher ratio (average ratio of number of students in primary and secondary school over number of full time teachers)-the ratio is then converted into number of teachers per 100 students to be used as one of the outputs; number of university students is used to measure the achievement of students
• Health: number of licensed doctors; number of hospital and health center beds
• Transport: passenger traffic by public transport (10000 person times); average passenger traffic of railway and highway (100 million person km) -to measure the usage of public transport, and transport capacity of main roads and railway
The China sample includes 31 provinces from 1998 to 2010. Data sources and variables are listed in Table 2 .
IV. Main Result and Discussion
In both dataset there was quite a significant proportion of increase in costs over time that was not explained by our output variables. In order to obtain meaningful results in the DEA analysis we decided to de-trend the cost series by using a standard regression approach. We estimated a cost function by regressing observed cost onto the output variables and including a linear time trend. A Cobb-Douglas and a translog specifications were used for the cost functional form. We also used both OLS and fixed effects with both functional specifications. In all cases the data fit is very good and the coefficient of the time trend is significant. We found a trend of around 15% for China and 5% for the UK (this is the part of cost increase which cannot be explained by outputs). Since the fixed effects translog model is the most general (it nests all the others) and since the standard errors of this model are not much higher than the other models, we decided to use the time trend coefficients associated with this model in order to de-trend the cost series (it should also be emphasized that the other models may suffer from mis-specification and inconsistency). The fact that all models point to more or less the same value lead us to believe that there was an increase in cost dictated by some type of inflation that was not well captured by the GDP deflator. The de-trended cost series were calculated applying the rates of increase implied by the fixed effects translog model, i.e. 5% for UK and 15% for China. Tables 3 and 4 report the DEA decomposition analysis, while tables 5 and 6 report the same values expressed in percentage terms. By looking at the percentages the differences are striking. The most important component in China is technical inefficiency (64.9%) while in UK this component accounts only for about 36.6%. Note that technical inefficiency arises from individual regions falling short of best practices. On the contrary the re-allocation component accounts for only about 10% in China and a striking 54.9% in the UK. As mentioned in the methodology section, re-allocation inefficiency is attributable to input reallocation across regions and it arises because of possible scale and input mix effects. Finally, the impact of quality shows different trends too, accounting for almost half of UK overall technical inefficiency and less than 20% in China. In other words, the impact of quality is stronger in UK regions than China regions: a larger part of the output loss in UK regions when compared to regions in China is attributed to the observed level of quality differential.
Our rationale for the choice of the two countries was that China is an example of a fiscal decentralized system, while UK is a highly centralized fiscal system. By examining the results reported in the previous tables, it is quite clear that in the decentralized system (China) allocation of resources for public service delivery (our reallocation component) seems to be addressed well. This is mirrored by a highly disperse level of ITE across regions, which points to the possibility that best practices are not effectively enforced via decentralization. On the contrary the centralized system (UK) is quite effective in pushing adoption of best practices as indicated by the low weight ITE has on overall country inefficiency; this comes at the expense of a high level of reallocation inefficiency: the UK (unlike China) seems to be less able to allocate resources efficiently across regions.
Can we make sense of this result?
The differences in the relative weight of the different components for the two countries is striking. Even though we cannot formally test if these differences are caused by the way the fiscal structure is organized, we can still make an argument that the effect of decentralization on public service delivery efficiency is not neutral. It seems to indicate a sort of trade off between efficient resource allocation across regions and efficient best practice operation at regional level. We think such a trade-off is quite consistent with various strands of literature related to the theories of firms and theories of public finance.
In principle, if a complete contract is possible, then central government can design it in order to obtain information from local government (see (Myerson 1982) for the statement of revelation principle) and use it to allocate resources efficiently. Incompleteness of contracts means that, under decentralization, local government has greater incentives to obtain local information than central government ( (Cremer, Estache and Seabright 1994) ). In addition, even if central and local governments have symmetric information, theories of organization suggest that decentralized information processing under the setting of constrained information processing capacity of any single centralized planner, could spontaneously coordinate more efficient resource allocation (for a review of decentralized information process and theories of organization, see (van Zandt 1996) and (van Zandt 1997)). With local government's information advantage (also see (Oates 1972) and (Tiebout 1956 ) for the traditional theory of public finance arguing for decentralization) and decentralized information processing, it is therefore not surprising that decentralization deals with allocation of inputs across regions more efficiently than centralization.
Local governments may also have the incentive to use information for their own interests and this incentive costs may grow with increasing vertical layers (see (Mookherjee n.d.) for a review of modeling incentives in mechanism design theory). Since centralization means there is effectively one vertical layer only, incentive costs may be more serious with decentralization. This could perhaps explain why individual regions in a decentralized system like China have more disperse technical inefficiency than the UK. Moreover, similar to the incompleteness of contracts between local and central government regarding local information, contracts between regions will be incomplete and there will consequently be limits to the extent to which externalities can be internalized purely by bargaining between regions under decentralization (see (Seabright n.d.) ). Centralization by allowing the central government to control and oversee the overall system, could internalize externalities between regions 4 ; and this could perhaps reduce heterogeneity in performance across regions and push individual regions to achieve their potential benchmark (as we observe with the UK regions).
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the sources of inefficiency of public service delivery in two countries, the UK and China. Our methodology allows us to examine the two countries separately, while still being able to provide some degree of cross-country comparison. We do so by com-puting the inefficiency at country level based on regional efficiency estimates. Country level inefficiency is then decomposed into three components which indicate different sources of inefficiency. This decomposition allows us to account explicitly for quality attributes of public service delivery via an indicator that completely quantifies the trade-off between output quantity and observed quality outcomes. The differences in terms of sources of inefficiency in the two countries are striking. China shows a relatively efficient allocation of resources across regions in contrast to a highly dispersed level of regional technical inefficiency. On the contrary, in the UK, technical inefficiency at regional level is relatively low compared to the high level of inefficiency of resource allocation across regions. We believe this could indicate a potential trade-off between efficient resource allocation across regions and efficient delivery of public service at regional level. This may be rationalized using existing off-the-shelf theoretical literature. Decentralized systems, while promoting a more efficient allocation of resources with decentralized information processing capacity, are more inclined to suffer from distorted incentive costs (which increase with the number of vertical layers) which may lead to lack of best practices. On the contrary a centralized system may be more capable of faciliating the adoption of best practices by overseeing the whole system, but at the cost of generating an inefficient allocation of resources with constrained information processing capacity of central planners. 
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